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CLEANING UP CERCLA: UNIROYAL CHEMICAL
COMPANY V. DEL TECH CORPORATION HELPS DEFINE THE




Regardless of your stance on environmental issues, almost all
of us can agree that environmental polluters should not be able to
escape liability on a technicality. Unfortunately, many do because of
the vast number of ambiguities contained in the legislation controlling
such pollution: the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA").' CERCLA was
created to assure "that those responsible for any damage, environmental
harm, or injury from chemical poisons bear the cost of their actions."2
Despite this noble goal, CERCLA is often considered vague and
contradictory.3 Thus, when a court attempts to apply provisions under
CERCLA, the Act's inherent lack of clarity creates many holes through
which a polluter may escape.
Uniroyal Chemical Co. v. Deltech Corp.4 was a recent case
where the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with
two issues, both stemming from ambiguities within CERCLA. The
issues arose in typical fashion. The defendants in the action hoped to
avoid liability under the Act by citing to CERCLA's questionable
language. The first issue concerned whether a "disposal" had to take
place before liability under CERCLA could be imposed.5 The second
'Technical Editor, Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law. B.A. 1997,
Centre College; J.D. 2000, University of Kentucky College of Law.
'CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
'S. Rep. No. 96-848, at 13 (1980).
3See Uniroyal Chem. Co. v. Deltech Corp. 160 F.3d 283,246 (5th Cir. 1998); Seee.g.,
Amoco Oil Co. v. Burton, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[CERCLA has] acquired a
well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an indefinite if not contradictory,
legislative history.") (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F.Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985));
HRW Sys., Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F.Supp. 318, 327 (D. Md. 1993); Rhodes v.
County of Darlington, 833 F.Supp. 1163, 1174 (D.S.C. 1992) ("CERCLA is not a paradigm of
clarity or precision. It has been criticized frequently 'for inartful drafting and numerous
ambiguities .... '. ) (quoting Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3rd
Cir. 1988)); United States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("[CERCLA is]
unusually fiddled by self-serving and contradictory statements.").
4160 F.3d 283 (5th Cir. 1998).
5See id. at 244.
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issue concerned a specific statutory exception to CERCLA liability,
namely the "consumer product exception."6 The decision in Uniroyal
will be the focus of this comment.
First, this comment will focus on the portions of CERCLA at
issue in Uniroyal. Next, the details of that case will be examined. In
Part III, the Uniroyal decision will be analyzed in light of other relevant
law and policy considerations. Finally, the future implications of the
Uniroyal case will be considered.
II. RELEVANT CERCLA PROVISIONS
A. Generally
CERCLA operates in two ways. First, through the Superfund,
it provides money to the government and/or other entities for the
cleanup of waste sites.7 Secondly, it provides a cause of action against
those parties'who should be held responsible for the costs of an
environmental cleanup.8 This cause of action can be utilized by private
parties to recover the costs associated with responding to an
environmental threat.9 This comment will only deal with the cost-
recovery aspect of CERCLA.
B. Prima Facie Case for a Private Cost-Recovery Action
To establish a prima facie case under the private cost-recovery
portion of CERCLA, certain requirements must be met. It is important
to note that these factors are not expressly identified within CERCLA.
The Act simply lists four classes of potentially responsible parties.'"
The courts have used this list to establish four elements that must be
proven to establish a prima facie case for a cost-recovery action." A
plaintiff must prove: "(1) that the site in question is a 'facility' under
§ 9601(9); (2) that the defendant is a 'responsible person' under §
9607(a); (3) that a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance occurred; and (4) that the release or threatened release caused
6See id. at 250.
'See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 961 l(a)(2).
8See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
9See id.
")See id.
"See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 242 n.7.
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the plaintiff to incur response costs."'1 2 Basically, the elements seem to
follow a typical negligence scheme. Duty is established via the first
and second elements. Breach is shown under the third element. Lastly,
proximate causation and damages must be proven by the fourth
requirement. The court in Uniroyal Chemical Co. v. Deltech Corp.
only discusses the first and second elements of the prima facie case for
a cost-recovery action under CERCLA. Hence, this comment will be
focused in the same manner.
1. The First Requirement: The Site Must Be a "Facility" Under
§ 9601(9) of CERCLA
Showing that the site in question is a "facility" under § 9601(9)
is the first element required to establish the prima facie case for cost-
recovery under CERCLA. 3 "Facility," is defined in subsection
§9601(9) as:
(A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or
pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or publically owned
treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch,
landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or
aircraft, or
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been
deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to
be located; but does not include any consumer product in
consumer use or any vessel. 4
The last sentence of subsection (B) is of particular relevance to
the Uniroyal case. It is called the "consumer product exception."'1
5
Even if a cleanup site would normally qualify as a "facility" under
CERCLA, a defendant may avoid this label and ultimate liability if their
site can be considered as a "consumer product in consumer use."' 6 How
should this exception be applied? This question was the focus of one




1'42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
"5See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 243.
1642 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
"See infra notes 51-59, 109-43 and accompanying text.
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2. The Second Requirement: The Defendant Must Be a
"Responsible Person" Under § 9607(a) of CERCLA
The second element for establishing a prima facie case for cost-
recovery under CERCLA requires the plaintiff to show that the
defendant(s) is considered a "responsible person" as defined by §
9607(a) of CERCLA. 8 This section sets up four classes of potentially
responsible persons:
(1) the owner and operator of a... facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any
facility at which time such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or
otherwise arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances
owned or possessed by such person . . ., at any
facility..., and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any
hazardous substances for transport to disposal or
treatment facilities ... or sites selected by such
person.' 9
In the Uniroyal case, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants
fell under the first class of "responsible persons" as owners/operators
of a facility.2 Does subsection (1) require more than mere ownership
or operation of a facility? This question presents the second major
issue considered in the Uniroyal decision.21
8See Uniroyal Chem.Co., 160 F.3d at 243.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
2See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 243.
2See infra notes 45-50, 63-108 and accompanying text.
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m11. UNIROYAL CHEMICAL CO. v. DELTECH CORP.
A. Facts of the Case
1. Background
In July of 1993, a tanker truck leaked twenty-one tons of a
chemical mixture into the environment at a trucking terminal in Port
Allen, Louisiana.2" The chemical mixture was a combination of vinyl
Toluene ("VT"') and Naugaurd ("I-5").23
2. The Parties
The driver of the tanker truck was employed by Safeway
Transportation, Inc. ("Safeway"). 24 The chemical VT was picked up
from its manufacturer, Deltech Corporation ("Deltech"), in Baton
Rouge, Louisiana.25 The other part of the mixture, 1-5, was added by
Uniroyal Chemical Company, Inc. ("Uniroyal") in Bay Minette,
Alabama.26 Safeway leased the tanker truck from TMI Enterprises, Inc.
("TMI"). 27 TMI also owned the trucking terminal where the accident
occurred.28
3. Events Giving Rise to the Cause of Action
In response to the chemical spill, environmental officials in
Louisiana immediately assessed the environmental threat and advised
TMI, Safeway, Uniroyal, and Deltech that emergency action would be
required.29 Uniroyal was the only company that responded and took
action.30  Uniroyal's clean-up effort consisted of removing
contaminated soil, damming nearby waterways, and collecting
thousands of gallons of contaminated stormwater for treatment3 The
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total expense to Uniroyal exceeded $2.3 million.32 Uniroyal attempted
to get reimbursement from Safeway, TMI, and Deltech.3 3 All refused
to contribute.34
4. Procedure
a. Federal District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana
In order to force the other three companies to shoulder some of
the clean-up costs, Uniroyal filed suit in federal district court.35 The
claim asserted a cause of action, provided by CERCLA, that allows a
party to recover environmental clean-up costs from other responsible
parties.36  Subsequent to Uniroyal's suit, Deltech settled with
Uniroyal.3' Therefore, the focus ofUniroyal's cost-recovery action was
narrowed to TMI and Safeway.38
Both the plaintiff and the defendants filed motions for summary
judgment.39 Subsequently, all parties agreed that no triable issues
existed.4" Basically, no facts were in dispute; thus, the district court
ruled on Uniroyal's claim as a matter of law.4
In Uniroyal's motion for summary judgment it claimed that, in
light of the facts, it had proven all four elements necessary to establish
a prima facie claim for cost-recovery under CERCLA.42 In a cross
motion for summary judgment, the defendants claimed that the
plaintiffs could not prove the first two elements of the prima facie
case.43 The defendants' motion was based upon a contention that the
relevant statutory provisions did not apply to them 4 and/or they





31See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)).
31See id. at 241 n.3.
3"See id. at 241 n.4.





"See id.; see also infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
45See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 241; infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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case depended entirely on the district court's interpretations of two
relevant CERCLA provisions.46
i. The "Disposal Requirement" Claim
The first issue decided by the district court dealt with the
second element required for establishing a prima facie case for cost-
recovery under CERCLA. As discussed above, this element requires
proof that the defendant(s) are considered "responsible persons" under
§9607(a) of CERCLA. 47 Uniroyal had claimed that TMI and Safeway
qualified under § 9607(a)(1) as the "owner or operator" of a facility."
The defendants answered that they should not qualify under this
subsection because the chemical spill in question was not the result of
a "disposal" effort.49 Of the four classes of "responsible persons" under
CERCLA, the last three contain disposal requirements."0 The
defendants insisted that a disposal requirement should be read into the
first, the owner/operator class, thereby removing them from liability."
The district court did not agree. It refused to infer such a requirement
and chose to follow the plain language of the statute. 2 Therefore, the
district court found that Uniroyal had proven the second element
required for its CERCLA cost-recovery action.
ii. The "Consumer Product Exception" Claim
The other issue analyzed by the district court concerned the
first element of the prima facie case for cost-recovery under
CERCLA.5 3 As discussed above, establishing this element requires a
showing that the site in question qualifies as a "facility" under §
9601 (9).54 The defendants asserted that this showing could not be
made. 5 They contended that the consumer product exception, listed at
"As stated previously, the facts were not disputed by any of the parties. The district
court's decision depended on how the language of CERCLA should be applied to the facts after
the relevant provisions were interpreted by the court.
4"See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
48See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 241.
41See id.
"See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
5 See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 241.
"See id.
"See id.
14See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
"See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 241.
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the end of § 9601(9), should apply in their case.56 Thus, the district
court had to resolve one of the many ambiguities within CERCLA:
what is a consumer product? The defendants claimed that a consumer
product, for the purposes of this exception, was any useful, non-waste
product.57 The court found support for the defendants' claim in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Dayton Independent School
District v. US. Mineral Prod. Co.58 where "all hazardous substances
with a useful purpose in production activities" were found to qualify
under the consumer product exception.59 Since the VT/I-5 mixture was
a useful product, the district court agreed with the defendants and held
that the consumer product exception applied.6' Therefore, the district
court found that Uniroyal had not established the first required element
for a cost-recovery action under CERCLA.6 1
b. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
As discussed previously, all four elements of the prima facie
case must be proven to allow recovery.62 Therefore, even though the
disposal requirement issue had been decided in Uniroyal's favor, the
action against TMI and Safeway could not stand. Uniroyal appealed the
decision to the Fifth Circuit.63  The court of appeals reviewed the
district court's decision to determine whether granting summary
judgment for the defendants (thereby denying summary judgment for
Uniroyal) was proper.' Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit had to decide




'8906 F.2d 1059 (5h Cir. 1990).




'See supra notes I I- 12 and accompanying text.
6"See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 241.
"See id. at 241-42. Normally, in reviewing a summary judgment, a court would simply
decide if their were any issues of fact that could be resolved in favor of the non-movant. lfgenuine
issues existed, summary judgment was not proper. In this case, all parties had stipulated that no
facts were in dispute. Therefore, the court of appeals had to decide whether the district court had
followed proper legal principles when it granted summary judgment for the defendants.
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i. The "Disposal Requirement" Claim
First, the court of appeals discussed whether the district court
had correctly decided the "disposal requirement" issue.65 Specifically,
the court asked whether an owner/operator should have to "dispose" of
a hazardous substance before they can be considered a "responsible
person" under CERCLA. 6 The court noted that this question was an
issue of first impression for the Fifth Circuit and most likely, an issue
of first impression for any United States court of appeals.67
(a) CERCLA's Overall Scheme
The court began its analysis of this first issue by looking at the
overall statutory scheme of CERCLA. 6' TMI and Safeway contended
that, when the owner/operator class of "responsible person" was viewed
in light of the rest of CERCLA, it was evident that Congress only
intended the Act to apply to waste disposal.69
The court started with an examination of § 9601(9), the
provision defining a CERCLA facility.7" The court noted that the scope
of "facility" is very expansive. It covers everything from traditional
waste sites to buildings, pipelines and even motor vehicles.71 In
addition, § 9601 contains the catch-all phase "any site or area where a
hazardous substance ... otherwise comes to be located."72 In light of
this expansive definition of facility, the court concluded, this section of
CERCLA did not support the claims of TMI.73
The court then turned to the term "release" under CERCLA.74
As noted previously, the third element for establishing a case for cost-
recovery requires proof that a "release" of a hazardous substance
occurred." The CERCLA section that defines release, § 9601(22),
65See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 242.
6See id.
"See id.
6See id. at 244.
"See id.
7"See id. at 244-45 (referring to 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)). This is also the provision that
contains the "consumer product exception." The proper definition for this exception is the next
issue decided by the court. See infra notes 109-140 and accompanying text.
"See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 245 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)).
'Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9)).
"See id.
4See id.
"5See supra note 12 and accompanying text. This third element of the prima facie case
for clean-up cost recovery was not at issue. As noted, the focus was only upon the first two
requirements. Here, the court merely looked to the third element and the term "release" in its
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describes the term very broadly. For example, "release" can be any
type of "spilling, leaking, ... emitting... [or] escaping."76 These types
of "releases" would occur under non-disposal circumstances. Once
again, the statutory language was directly in conflict with any type of
"disposal requirement."
Lastly, the court looked at the definition of the term "hazardous
substance" under CERCLA.77 Under § 9601(14) the term covers a wide
range of substances, from "toxic pollutants" and "hazardous waste" to
any "element, compound [or] mixture. 78 "Hazardous substance" is
clearly not limited to disposable materials.
In light of these three relevant definitions within CERCLA, the
court of appeals concluded that a "disposal requirment" could not be
inferred from the plain language of the Act.79
(b) CERCLA's Legislative History
In its search for a "disposal requirement" under CERCLA, the
court next turned to CERCLA's legislative history for guidance.8" The
court began by noting many criticisms of CERCLA. Due to the rushed
circumstances under which CERCLA was passed, many commentators
and courts have concluded that the Act lacks clarity, conciseness or a
useful legislative history.81 However, the Fifth Circuit felt that the
legislative history relevant to a possible "disposal requirement" was
quite clear.82
The court focused on the legislative compromise that had
created CERCLA.8 1 CERCLA is the end-product of three proposed
bills, each of which covered a different aspect of environmental
pollution. 8 One specifically covered oil-spill damage and clean-up
course of reviewing CERCLA's overall statutory scheme for a "disposal requirement."
76Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 245 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 9601(22)).
"See id. at 245-46.
7'id.at 245 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 9601(14)).
79See id. at 246.
'See id.
"See supra note 3.
82See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 246-47.
83See id. at 246-48. The three competing bills were the following: the Oil Pollution
Liability and Compensation Act, H.R. 85, 96th Cong. (1979), the Hazardous Waste Containment
Act, H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. (1980), and the Environmental Emergency Response Act, S. 1480,
96th Cong. (1979). See id. at 246-47 (citing Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 3-7 (1982); THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY xiii (Helen C. Needham & Mark Henefee eds. 1982)).54See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 247.
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costs." Another sought to remedy the problem of inactive hazardous
waste sites.86 The third, and most far-reaching, sought to regulate all
releases of hazardous chemicals into the environment.87 None of the
bills were passed.88 The Fifth Circuit noted the main flaw in the bills
that prevented their enactment: they were too narrow. 89 Discussion on
the House and Senate floors revealed Congress' desire to create one
piece of legislation that covered waste sites and releases of hazardous
chemicals in to the environment.9" Under these circumstances,
CERCLA was born.9' Accordingly, the court recognized, the legislative
history of CERCLA did not support any type of "disposal
requirement."92
(c) Case Law
The court turned to relevant case law in another attempt to find
a "disposal requirement" under CERCLA. 93 First, the Fifth Circuit
looked to its own cases. TMI and Safeway asserted that the court had
limited CERCLA's application to waste sites in three cases: Dayton
Independent School District v. U.S. Mineral Products Co. ,94 In re Bell
Petroleum Services., Inc.95 and Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.96
In the Dayton case, the Fifth Circuit was presented with the
problem of imposing CERCLA liability in an asbestos-removal
situation.97 The Uniroyal court recounted its assertion in Dayton that
CERCLA only applies to hazardous waste sites.98 However, the
Uniroyal court did not afford much weight to its prior decision in
Dayton. It dismissed its prior notions about CERCLA as relatively
uninformed and pure dicta "that cannot reasonably be relied upon as a
definitive holding on ... whether CERCLA liability extends beyond
waste disposal sites." 99
8See id. (citing Grad, supra note 82, at 3-4 (referring to H.R. 85)).
"See id. (citing Grad, supra note 82, at 5 (referring to H.R. 7020)).
87See id. (citing Grad, supra note 82, at 6-7 (referring to S. 1480)).
'See id. (citing THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE,supra note 85, at xviii).
89See id. (citing 126 CONG. REC. S 14964-65 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph)).
9 See id. (citing 126 CONG. REC. S 14964-65).
91See id. at 248 (citing Grad, supra note 85, at 35).
'See id. at 248.
93See id. at 248-49.
94906 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1990).
913 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1993).
96889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
97See Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d at 1064.
98See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 248 (refering to Dayton, 906 F.2d at 1066).
991d.
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The court summarily dismissed the other two cases as well. It
stated that a mere "cursory review of those cases belies the defendants'
argument."'00 Strangely, the court did not even conduct this "cursory
review." Nevertheless, the court stated that it had never squarley
addressed a "disposal requirement" under CERCLA."'0
Next, the court considered cases from other circuits. A few
federal district courts have held that CERCLA only applies to waste
disposal sites." 2 With little discussion, the Fifth circuit found these
cases "neither binding nor persuasive."'
0 3
(d) The EPA's View on a "Disposal Requirement"
Even though the defendants did not mention the EPA in their
argument, the Uniroyal court looked to the enforcement agency to
complete its search for a "disposal requirement" under CERCLA.'"
The court considered this inquiry to be necessary and relevant since a
court must defer to the opinion of the EPA in the absense of clear
legislative intent."'
Apparently, the court found, or decided to mention, only one
piece of relevant administrative material. The court discussed an
official EPA rule which added a residential duplex to a list of sites in
need of remedial clean-up action.016 The ruling drew criticism. Some
commented that this inclusion would violate the EPA's policy of only
providing funds for hazardous waste sites." 7 The EPA responded by
stating that "CERCLA . . .[does not limit] response to hazardous
waste."' 08 With little more discussion, the Uniroyal court added this
opinion to its pile of evidence against imposing a "disposal
requirement" under CERCLA.




o2 See id. at 249 (citing Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier, 755 F.supp. 1142, 1150-51 (D.
Conn. 1990); Electric Power Bd. of Chattanooga v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 716 F.Supp. 1069,
1080 (E.D. Tenn. 1988); Knox v. AC & S, Inc., 690 F.Supp. 752, 757 (S.D. Ind. 1988)).
1I31d
""'See id. at 249-50.
"See id. (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
"See id. at 250 (citing 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1985)).
''See id.
'0M. (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 37,630, 37,631-32 (1985).
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In light of all the relevant material, the Fifth Circuit did not find
a "disposal requirement" to be implicit in the owner/operator class of
"responsible persons" under CERCLA.'09 An action for recovery of
clean-up costs could stand without reference to any act of disposal by
the owner/operator in question. Hence, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision. Neither TIvil nor Safeway could escape
liability for clean-up costs, unless the "consumer product exception"
applied.
ii. The Claim Under the "Consumer Product Exception"
Following resolution of the first issue, the Uniroyal Court
turned to an analysis of the "consumer product exception." At the
district level, the court found that Uniroyal could not meet the first
element of the prima facie case for clean-up cost recovery (proving the
existence of a "facility") because the "consumer product exception"
applied."0 The lower court applied the exception in light of the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Dayton Independent Schools. "' Thus, in Uniroyal,
the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether the exception had been
applied correctly. The court conducted a careful analysis of the
exception. First, it discussed the applicability of its decision in Dayton.
Then the court decided what qualified as a "consumer product" and
whether the site in question fell into this category.
(a) Applicability of the Dayton Decision
The court began its analysis of the "consumer product
exception" by completely distinguishing the Dayton decision from the
Uniroyal case." 2 Dayton was a case where the plaintiffs initiated a cost
recovery action under CERCLA to redeem costs associated with the
removal of asbestos containing building materials (ACM's). 113 The
case was brought under the §9607(a)(3) definition of "responsible
person" as opposed to §9607(a)(1).' Hence, in Dayton, the plaintiffs
"BSee id.
"'See id.; see also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
"'See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 250; supra note 57 and accompanying text.
"'See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 250-52.
"3See id. at 250 (citing Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Prod. Co., 906 F.2d
1059, 1061-63 (5th Cir. 1990)).
"'See id.; see also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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contended that the defendants "arranged for disposal... of hazardous
substances.., at any facility" rather than claiming that the defendants
were owner/operators as in Uniroyal. "5 Accordingly, the plaintiffs in
Dayton had to prove that disposal had occurred. The Uniroyal court
stated that the decision in Dayton had focused almost entirely upon this
disposal requirement." 6 The plaintiffs in Dayton failed to prove a
"disposal" by the defendants." 1 7 As a consequence, the Dayton court
held that the clean-up cost recovery action could not stand against the
defendants." 18
The Dayton decision had not stopped with a discussion of the
disposal requirement, but continued on to discuss the applicability of
the "consumer product exception." ' 9 In addition to the lack of disposal
by the defendants, the Dayton court asserted that the defendants would
be protected by the "consumer product exception" because they were
engaged in "production activities with a useful purpose, as opposed to
those engaged in the disposal of hazardous substances."' 20 The Dayton
court continued,
It is clear that Congress did not intend CERCLA to
target legitimate manufacturers or sellers of useful
products. The legislative history reinforces [the]
argument that Congress intended to provide recovery
only for releases or threatened releases from inactive
and abandoned waste sites, not releases from useful
consumer products in the structure of buildings.'
The court in Uniroyal completely de-emphasized these
comments. It stated that the discussion of the consumer product
exception was dicta and not a necessary part of the holding in
Dayton.122 Furthermore, the Uniroyal court held that the discussion of
"'See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 250 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)).
"6See id at 251.
..See id. (citing Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d at 1065).
"'See id. (citing Dayton. ndep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d at 1065).
"'See id. (citing Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d at 1065-66).
12Id. (quoting Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d at 1065).
'1d. (quoting Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d at 1065-66).
"2See id. at 251-52. Here, the Uniroyal court cited Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 67 (1996) and Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 454-55 (1972) for the proposition that
a court is only bound by the part of a previous decision that was necessary to the holding. See id.
at 252. In Dayton, the plaintiffs could not maintain their cost recovery action because they could
not prove that the defendants had engaged in the "disposal" of hazardous substances. See supra
notes 117-20 and accompanying text. Hence, even though the Fifth Circuit had construed the
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the consumer product exception in Dayton was only applicable to the
facts in Dayton. 23  Consequently, the Fifth Circuit found that the
district court in Uniroyal read Dayton too broadly and that the Dayton
decision was not relevant when applied to the facts in Uniroyal.
2 4
(b) The Fifth Circuit's Interpretation of the
"Consumer Product Exception"
The last part of the Fifth Circuit's discussion of the "consumer
product exception" focused on finding a workable definition of
"consumer product" and then applying that definition to the facts in
Uniroyal. First, the court examined §9601(9),121 the subsection of
CERCLA defining "facility."'' 26 It sought to determine which part of
the section was modified by the term "consumer product" for the
purposes of the exception.1 7  The language of the subsection is
ambiguous on this point."' If the exception is read as modifying only
subsection (A) and (B), then any "facility" that contains a "consumer
product" is exempt from CERCLA liability.2 9 But, if the exception is
read as modifying the term "facility" (all of §9601(9)), then any facility
that is itself a consumer product is exempt from liability. 3° After a
lengthy analysis, the court concluded that the latter interpretation was
correct.' 3 ' Hence, the court narrowed its query to determining which
"facilities" could be considered "consumer products in consumer
use."'
132
In its search for a definition, the Fifth Circuit recognized that
neither CERCLA, nor any court of appeals, had developed a definitive
consumer product exception as protecting manufacturers or sellers of useful products in Dayton,
the Uniroyal Court was not bound by this finding.23See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 252.
124See id.
'2 See id. at 252-54.
126See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9); supra text accompanying note 14.
127See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 253.
12 See id.
129See id. Presumably, under this interpretation, if a facility releases a hazardous
substance that can be classified as a "consumer product," the exception applies. Therefore, in
Uniroyal, since the leaking tanker qualified as a facility, the exception would apply if the released
chemical mixture qualified as a consumer product.
13°See id. If the statute is read in this manner, the container of the hazardous substance
would have to qualify as a consumer product. Hence, in Uniroyal, the tanker would have to be
considered as a consumer product for the exception to apply.
1
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definition for "consumer product in consumer use." '133 The court noted,
however, that the district courts have developed relatively extensive
case law on the subject. 34 The Uniroyal court recognized two lines of
thought that have developed. 3 The first definition concludes that
"consumer products in consumer use," for the purposes of the
exception, are any substances that are considered economically
useful.' 36 The other interpretation considers only products used for
personal, household, or family consumption as consumer products.'37
In deciding which approach to adopt, the court turned to the definition
of consumer product in dictionaries, other legislative acts, and the
legislative history of CERCLA. 3' The court finally determined that the
latter definition was correct.'39 For a "facility" to qualify as a
"consumer product in consumer use" under the consumer product
exception, the "facility" must be a "good normally used for personal,
family, or household purposes, which is being used in that manner when
the subject release occurs. ' '1 4°
Finally, the court applied its new definition to the facts of
Uniroyal. The Fifth Circuit concluded that neither the trucking terminal
nor the tanker truck qualified as a "consumer product in consumer use"
for the purposes of CERCLA's "consumer product exception."''
B. Final Holding
In light of the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the consumer product
exception, the district court's decision on that issue was reversed.'42






36See id. (citing Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier, 755 F.Supp 1142, 1150 (D. Conn.
1990); Knox v. AC & S, Inc., 690 F.Supp. 752, 756 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Electric Power Board of
Chattanooga v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 716 F.Supp 1069, 1080 (E.D. Tenn. 1988)).
137See id. (citing generally United States v. MN Santa Clara I, 887 F.Supp 825, 842
(D.S.C. 1995); KN Energy Inc. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 840 F.Supp. 95, 99 (D. Colo. 1993);
Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 823 F.Supp. 1218, 1232-34 (E.D. Pa. 1993); CP Holdings,
Inc. v. Goldberg-Zoino & Assocs., Inc. 769 F.Supp. 432, 438 (D.N.H. 1991)).
3'See id. at 255-57.
1
39See id. at 257.
"1d. Presumably, under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation, releases of oil, household
cleaning products, gasoline, etc. from containers ("facilities") that were purchased by consumers





recovery under CERCLA were met by Uniroyal. 43 Consequently, the
court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for entry of
judgment in favor of Uniroyal.'" As a result, both Safeway and TI
were liable to Uniroyal for costs associated with the clean-up of the
VT/I-5 chemical mixture at the Safeway trucking terminal.
IV. ANALYSIS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNIROYAL
DECISION
A. The Disposal Requirement Issue
The analysis portion of this comment will begin with a look at
the Fifth Circuit's holding on the "disposal requirement" issue in
Uniroyal. In review, the defendants, TMI and Safeway, wanted the
court to read a "disposal requirement" into the owner/operator class of
responsible person under CERCLA' 45 The other three classes of
responsible person require some type of disposal of hazardous
substance before liability can be imposed upon that class.'" The
owner/operator class contained no such language. '47 Basically, TI and
Safeway claimed that a disposal requirement had to be inserted because
CERCLA was only intended to cover hazardous waste disposal sites. 4 '
The Uniroyal court, however, refused to find that disposal was implicit
in the owner/operator class. '49 Accordingly, the court held that a party
can be considered a "responsible person" under CERCLA simply by
qualifying as an owner or operator of a facility. I°
One would think that the court's decision on this issue has to
be right. The court's analysis was extensive. First, the legislative
history of CERCLA seems to support the court's position in every
way. "' Secondly, the EPA has stated that the scope of CERCLA is not
limited to hazardous waste sites.'52 Third, the overall scheme of
CERCLA reveals a larger application.'53 And most importantly, the
'43See id.; see also supra notes I 1-1 2 and accompanying text.
'"See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 257.
1'See id. at 242.
'"See supra text accompanying note 18.
'47See supra text accompanying note 18.
'48See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 242.
'
49See id. at 250.
" See id.
"'See id. at 246-48.
1
52See id. at 249-50.
'See id. at 244-46.
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language of the statute does not require disposal.154 The Uniroyal
defendants argued that since the other three classes of responsible
persons under CERCLA contain some type of disposal requirement, the
owner/operator class should as well. 55 On the contrary, this assertion
almost belies their position. In fact, their argument seems more
persuasive when turned around. When Congress drafted the CERCLA
provision listing classes of "responsible persons," they obviously
considered CERCLA's applicability to disposal sites because they
chose to include "disposal" as a part of three of the classes. Would they
just forget the requirement for the owner/operator class when they
really wanted it there? Of course not. Quite obviously, Congress
intended to exclude a disposal requirement from this first, largest, and
potentially most important class of "responsible person." The
legislature's desire for CERCLA to cover all types of hazardous waste
releases is apparent.
With almost all the relevant factors running against any type of
disposal requirement for the owner/operator class, how could any court
take the position that CERCLA only applies to waste disposal sites?
The Uniroyal defendants claimed that three cases from the Fifth Circuit
supported their position.'56 The court was correct in disposing of this
notion in summary fashion. After only a cursory examination, these
cases cannot be considered to support the contention that CERCLA
only applies to waste disposal. In two of the cases, Amoco Oil Co.'57
and In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc.,"58 the defendants seemed to
extract about one sentence from each case that might support their
position, only if considered completely out of context. 5 9 In the third
case, Dayton Independent School District v. U.S. Mineral Products Co.,
the Fifth Circuit did require disposal before the defendants could be
considered "responsible persons."' 60 But, this was due to the fact that
the plaintiffs in that case were suing the defendants as a class of
'4See id. at 244.
'"SSee id.
" See id. at 248. The cited cases were Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Mineral
Products Co., 906 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Bell Petroleum Serv., Inc., 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir.
1993); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc. 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
57889 F.2d at 667.
s83 F.3d at 894.
'The defendants quoted "[CERCLA's] purpose is to facilitate the prompt clean-up of
hazardous waste sites" from In re Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc. 3 F.3d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1993) and
"Congress enacted CERCLA in response to well-publicized toxic waste problems" from Amoco
Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc. 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989). See Uniroyal Chem.Co., 160 F.3d at
248.
'"See Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d at 1066.
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"responsible person" that expressly requires disposal, not the
owner/operator class. 6' Clearly, case law from the Fifth Circuit offered
no support for TMI and Safeway. However, the Uniroyal court did
mention a few other courts that have concluded that CERCLA only
applies to waste disposal sites: Electric Power Board of Chattanooga
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,162 Knox v. AC & S, Inc.,'63 and Vernon
Village v. Gottier.164
The cases that have limited the scope of CERCLA to waste
disposal sites should not have much influence on future interpretations
of the act. This prediction is supported by several factors. First, these
cases have been widely criticized by other courts in addition to the Fifth
Circuit. 165 Secondly, these three cases were decided from nine to eleven
years ago."6 The majority of recent case law on the subject recognizes
the larger applicability of CERCLA. 167  Third, the limitation of
CERCLA to waste sites is not supported by the bulk of CERCLA's
legislative history or the plain language of the act. 168 Last, these cases
were not followed by the Fifth Circuit in Uniroyal.169 This is a very
important consideration because Uniroyal was the first case in which
a United States court of appeals squarely addressed whether the
applicability of CERCLA was limited to waste disposal sites. ' In light
of all these factors, it would seem that cases like Vernon Village' 71 and
Knox 172 are obsolete. Henceforth, there should be little doubt that
CERCLA was created to cover almost all types of hazardous substance
release, from a barrel leak in the creek to a rupture on the roadside.
16'See id. at 1064.
t 716 F.Supp. 1069 (E.D. Tenn. 1988).
1690 F.Supp. 752 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
'4755 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Conn. 1990).
"See First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862,866 (4th Cir.
1989)(refusing to follow the Knox court opinion that CERCLA was concerned only with disposal);
Reading Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 823 F.Supp. 1218, 1239 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 1993)(criticizing the
Electric Power Board court for concluding that airborne chemicals must be released into the
outside air, as opposed to the ambient air, for CERCLA liability to hold).
'6See supra notes 164-66.
..7See Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carrol Carolina Oil Co., Inc., 191 F.3d 409, 417 (4th Cir.
1999); California v. Blech, 976 F.2d 525,526-27 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Tropical Fruit,
S.E., 2000 WL628875 *1 I (D. Puerto Rico 2000).
'"See Uniroyal Chemical Co. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238,244-48 (5th Cir. 1998);
supra notes 66-91 and accompanying text.
-6See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 249.
'"0See id. at 242.
.. Vernon Village, Inc. v. Gottier, 755 F.Supp. 1142 (D. Conn. 1990).
"Knox v. AC & S, Inc. 690 F.Supp. 752 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
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B. The Consumer Product Exception Issue
The second point of analysis concerns the Fifth Circuit's
conclusions about CERCLA's consumer product exception. The court
held that the phase "consumer product in consumer use," within the
exception, referred to "facility."' 73 Thus, the CERCLA facility in
question must itself be the consumer product for a defendant to qualify
for the exception. Next, the court ruled that for a facility to qualify as
a "consumer product in consumer use," the facility must be something
that is "normally used for.., household purposes which was being used
in that manner when the subject release occurred."'' 74 Seemingly,
through these holdings, the Fifth Circuit intended to narrow the
consumer product exception to the greatest extent possible.
Arguably, resolution of this second issue will have the greater
impact. This is due, in part, to the fact that there is more disagreement
among courts over this exception. Also, like the disposal requirement
issue, no court of appeals has squarely analyzed the issue. And finally
the Uniroyal decision, by limiting its holding in Dayton, removes the
underpinnings from many cases that have given the consumer product
exception a broad reading.
Movement towards establishing a steadfast definition for
"consumer product in consumer use" should be one important
consequence of the Uniroyal decision. As the Fifth Circuit discussed,
there are two lines of thought on the meaning of "consumer product in
consumer use."'175
Some courts have interpreted consumer product as any useful
product.'76 All of the cases that have reached this conclusion have
explored the issue in cursory fashion. None have conducted the in-
depth research that was presented by the court in Uniroyal. These
courts did not take the time to set up a working definition for
"consumer product in consumer use." They simply stated that the
consumer product exception was intended to exempt those who engage
in production activities with a useful purpose. Then, if the "facility" in
'See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 254.
-1"d. at 257.
'See id. at 254-55.
76See supra note 138.
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question is any type of useful product, the court finds that the exception
applies.' This reading does not make sense on two levels.
First, it is contrary to the legislative history of CERCLA and
the basic definition of consumer product as set forth in dictionaries, by
the EPA, and in other legislation. 7 8 Secondly, interpreting "consumer
product" so broadly seems like another way of requiring some type of
disposal for a defendant to be liable under CERCLA. This consequence
is not discussed by the courts but seems implicit in a broad reading of
the consumer product exception. For example, assume that a court held
that the owner/operator class of responsible person under CERCLA did
not require disposal (as in Unitroyal). Further assume that the only
issue left to resolve concerns the consumer product exception. If the
court holds that all useful products qualify under the consumer products
exception, only a facility that is a non-useful product can be covered by
CERCLA. In all likelihood, any non-useful product will be some form
of waste for disposal. Although some exceptions may exist, it appears
that construing the consumer product exception as applying to all useful
products is simply another way of limiting CERCLA's application to
the disposal of hazardous materials. In fact, language from the cases
that support a broad reading of the consumer products exception
indicates that these courts view CERCLA in this narrow fashion. 17 This
line of thought, as we know from the preceding discussion on the
disposal requirement, is not consistent with the original purposes of
CERCLA. 80
The other line of cases that has analyzed CERCLA's consumer
product exception has found the exception to apply only to those
products used for personal, family, or household consumption. I8 This
is the better reasoned approach adopted by the court in Uniroyal. Other
courts, in light of the well supported analysis of the issue in Uniroyal,
"See Vernon Village v. Gottier, 755 F.Supp. 1142, 1150 (D. Conn. 1990)(relying
solely on cases like Dayton and Knox, which differed factually, to conclude that water was a
consumer product in consumer use); Knox v. AC & S, Inc. 690 F.Supp. 752, 756 (S.D. Ind. 1988)
(concluding without explanation that insulation was a consumer product because it is a commercial
product sold in business); Electric Power Board of Chattanooga v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
716 F.Supp. 1069, 1080 (E.D. Tenn. 1988)(finding simply that transformers were consumer
products because the court believed they were).
7 See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 255-57.
'"See Vernon Village, Inc., v. Gottier, 755 F.Supp. 1142, 1150 (D. Conn. 1990);
Electric Power Bd. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 716 F.Supp. 1069, 1080-81 (E.D. Tenn. 1988);
Knox v. AC & S, Inc. 690 F.Supp. 752 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
'"See supra notes 63-107 and accompanying text.
'See supra note 139.
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should not have a problem defining consumer product in consumer use.
The fact that the Fifth Circuit is the first United States court of
appeals to squarely analyze the consumer product exception'82 is
another important feature affecting the impact of the Uniroyal decision.
Not only will the case influence other courts to read the exception more
narrowly, it should tilt the scales completely. The issue, prior to
Uniroyal, was only debated among the district courts.'83 District courts
were relatively free to resolve the exception issue as they pleased.
Now, however, Uniroyal stands as a strong precedent in support of a
narrow reading of the consumer product exception.
A final factor that will broaden the impact of Uniroyal's holding on
the consumer product exception is the Fifth Circuit's discussion of its
decision in Dayton.' The Uniroyal defendants and the district court
cited Dayton as supporting a broad reading of the "consumer products
exception."' 85 More importantly, a great number of cases that have read
the exception to apply to all useful products have relied on the Dayton
decision. 6 In fact, Dayton seems to be the principal case on the issue.
In Uniroyal, the Fifth Circuit seems to assert that these courts have read
Dayton out of context.'87 This is a weak claim. The bottom line is that
Dayton does support a broad reading of the consumer product
exception. It would be hard to read Dayton any other way. Obviously,
the Fifth Circuit came to a different conclusion about the consumer
product exception in Uniroyal. But, instead of simply overruling
Dayton, they stated that the holding was limited to the facts of that case.
Why didn't the court overrule? The reason is not clear. Fortunately,
the effect of the limitation is almost the same as overruling Dayton.
Unless a court is presented with Dayton-like facts, Dayton is not good
law. That means that all of the cases citing Dayton rest, at best, on a
shaky foundation. Consequently, after Uniroyal, a defendant will be
hard pressed to find a court that will rely on Dayton or its progeny as
good precedent(s).
-52See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 254.
183See id.
'8Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Mineral Products Co., 906 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir.
1990).
,ssSee Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 241.
'"See Kane v. United States, 15 F.3d 87, 89 (8th Cir. 1994); Amcast Indus. Corp. v.
Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 750 (7th Cir. 1993).; Halloway v. Gaylord Chemical, 922 F.Supp. 1154,
1157 (E.D. La. 1996); G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 854 F.Supp. 539, 557 (S.D. Ill. 1994);
United States v. Wedzeb Enterprises, 844 F.Supp. 1328, 1335 (S.D. Ind. 1994); Anthony v.
Bleach, 760 F.Supp. 832, 836 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
'See Uniroyal Chem. Co., 160 F.3d at 250-52.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Uniroyal decision is a big step toward resolving some
serious ambiguities in CERCLA. The Fifth Circuit was able to define
the scope of 1) the owner/operator class responsible person and 2) the
consumer product exception. These determinations may seem simple.
In reality, they help answer a very serious question. Can a defendant be
liable for the accidental release of a useful, but hazardous substance?
Yes. Polluters beware!

